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Introduction
At this year’s Munich Security Conference, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, 
claimed that Russia and the West have slid into a “new Cold War.”1 By reconnecting 
with the old “Iron Curtain” rhetoric, Medvedev deliberately decided to omit that the 
current situation is largely attributable to a series of recent choices made by the 
Kremlin. When looking at the underlying factors that contributed to the East-West 
standoff, different views on regional integration in Eurasia between the European 
Union (EU) and Russia appear to have played a major role. Whereas Brussels has 
typically portrayed regional integration as a vehicle for positive change, Moscow has 
repeatedly dismissed efforts at fostering a partnership with Ukraine as a threat to 
its security – and does its utmost to portray European integration as a malign force. 
Ignoring that Ukraine is a sovereign nation and thus has the right to determine its 
own future is a remarkable omission, one that epitomises well the EU’s and Russia’s 
competing narratives on the virtues and pitfalls of European integration.2
These competing narratives are symptomatic of the way in which Russia and 
the EU interact with one another. Whereas the European Commission prefers to 
engage multilaterally with Russia, as a Union of 28, the Kremlin and powerful EU 
member states prefer to dialogue primarily on a bilateral basis. The effect is that 
Moscow, where possible, employs a tactic of ‘divide and rule’ whereby it either 
aims at weakening the centre (Brussels) by playing off Member States against one 
another, or undermine EU cohesion and coherence as a whole. To do that, it supports 
a wide range of actors that oppose what the EU stands for, not least through the 
articulation of powerful counter-narratives about European integration. This Policy 
Brief aims to shed more light on this approach by analysing: (i) how Russia engages in 
patterns of information and disinformation to spin certain narratives about Europe’s 
dependence on Russian natural gas imports, which can in turn undermine the EU’s 
efforts to create an Energy Union, and (ii) how the Kremlin draws on Eurosceptic 
political parties and stakeholders in support of certain narratives that advance its 
political goals of undermining the EU’s cohesion and coherence.
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From Russia with Gas
Considering that Europe imports roughly a third of its natural gas from Russia,3 
the ways in which Russia frames its discourse on the EU’s Energy Union is no 
mere issue of semantic disquisition. Overall, Russia uses two main disinformation 
techniques. On the one hand, it predicates the EU’s deceits. On the other, it 
uses different bilateral channels to deploy information asymmetrically to its own 
advantage. Two recent examples thereof are the planned extension of the Nord 
Stream pipeline and the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between 
Edison and DEPA on Russian gas exports to Italy and Greece.
Due to several incidents between Russia and Ukraine, the European Commission 
pledges to reduce dependence on Russian gas and enhance the resilience of the 
EU internal energy market. A cornerstone of this policy is the creation of the 
“Energy Union”; an attempt at closer integration of the EU’s energy market based 
on security of supply, sustainability and competitiveness. An overarching aim of 
the Energy Union is to limit the ability for external suppliers to drive a wedge 
between individual member states by offering lucrative deals that run counter 
to what is agreed upon at EU level. Instrumental in making this a success is to 
reduce the EU’s dependence on external sources of energy.
In June 2015, Gazprom announced it plans to expand the existing Nord Stream 
gas pipeline between Russia and Germany. At a time when the existing capacity 
of the first Nord Stream pipeline is not fully used and European gas demand 
is not expected grow anytime soon,4 the economic rationale behind building 
a second expensive subsea route is questionable.5 The real reason for building 
Nord Stream II therefore is geopolitical: it would cement Gazprom’s dominance 
in Europe at a time when the Energy Union aims to achieve the opposite and 
the pipeline would circumvent Ukraine, which Putin views as an unreliable 
transit state interfering with the control of its strategic markets.6 Suggestions 
by pro-Kremlin media that Nord Stream II is purely commercial are thus part of a 
deliberate disinformation campaign.7 Illustrative of the non-commercial nature 
of Nord Stream II is that, on 24 February, Green MEP Claude Turmes claimed 
the companies involved were told by Gazprom to stop sending gas through 
Ukraine as a condition for winning the project.8 A final element of Moscow’s 
disinformation strategy worth highlighting is that Nord Stream II enables Russia 
to weaken German solidarity within the EU – essential for sanctions relief – 
and creates a substantial foreign policy discord between Brussels and Kiev by 
undermining Ukraine’s status as a transit state.9
On 24 February Gazprom signed a MoU with Italy’s Edison and Greece’s DEPA on 
the delivery of Russian gas via the Black Sea, and unspecified third countries, to 
Italy and Greece.10 The agreement revives the Italy-Turkey-Greece-Interconnector 
(ITGI), a project that a few years ago lost a bid for gas from Azerbaijan. The 
project comes across as a déja-vu of South Stream, a defunct Russian pipeline 
project. South Stream was a pipeline designed to bring Russian gas to Austria via 
Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary and Slovenia. Putin cancelled the project in December 
2014 when he realised the pipeline would not comply with EU legislation. Italy, 
who through the energy company ENI was a major shareholder, was not amused. 
Italy’s frustration about the cancellation came to the fore on 15 December 
2015 when Prime Minister Matteo Renzi accused Germany of applying double 
standards when asking Rome to comply with sanctions against Russia, yet at 
the same time having no problems with striking a potentially lucrative deal with 
Gazprom. Renzi demanded EU law should apply equally to all projects.11 Although 
ITGI is much smaller and easier to build, the question of whether the pipeline 
will actually be constructed is largely irrelevant. This ‘new’ southern gas pipeline 
should really be seen as a strategic narrative to offer ‘compensation’ to Italy for 
Moscow’s withdrawal from South Stream, which would then neutralise Italian 
criticism of Nord Stream II.12 Interestingly, Italian government officials appear 
not to have been consulted about the MoU. By not informing Rome Gazprom 
inadvertently creates the impression that it only wanted to make it look like Italy 
gave its assent.13 This strengthens the view that the MoU is nothing more than 
disinformation. Given that it is unclear which states provide transit, this would 
also force potential candidates Turkey and Bulgaria to vie for the final shape of 
the pipeline route.
This tactic is simple and effective: to tempt different countries by promising to 
turn each of them into a ‘gas hub’. This has the effect of creating confusion and 
division within those countries and, critically, of recruiting valuable allies within 
their governments and companies.14 Better yet, such discussions effectively 
impede the development of a common energy policy at the EU level.15 
Why the Kremlin loves Eurosceptics
When Russia annexed Crimea and later stoked war in Eastern Ukraine, the 
Kremlin portrayed the move as the ‘the will of the people’ and how Russia was 
defending Russian-speakers from a ‘fascist’ government that had assumed 
power in Kiev.16 Ironically, Vladimir Putin has over time become the greatest 
supporter of Europe’s populist right and its neo-fascist fringe – and the love 
is mutual.17 How so? Again, to understand one should look at how the Kremlin 
wishes to deliberately undermine EU cohesion and coherence. If Moscow views 
EU integration as damaging to its interests,18 it is logical that Putin targets (i.e. 
by lending financial, political and discursive support) those political parties that 
wish to weaken Brussels, or outright dismantle the Union. 
The €9 million loan given to the French Front National is a case in point; a 
Kremlin bet on the future of French politics with an anti-EU signature written 
all over it.19 The fatal attraction between Russia’s leadership and extremism in 
Europe reaches its peak in the case of Putin’s bromance with Hungary’s President 
Viktor Orban. Orban repeatedly defied Brussels by reaching out to Putin despite 
the general EU line not to hold bilateral summits. Not only did Orban break 
this understanding, he went on referring to a general consensus among “all the 
countries of the EU” “that it is necessary to cooperate.”20 Also, Orban’s stated 
Policy   brief • n° 2016/2
                 Policy   brief • n° 2016/2
aim of abandoning liberal democracy in favour of creating an ‘illiberal state’ 
is seen as inspired by how Putin governs Russia.21 Putin has also been a source 
of inspiration to Eurosceptic figures such as UKIP’s leader Nigel Farage. In fact, 
it is only Russia’s historical enmity with Poland that prevents Moscow from 
giving a similar ‘fist bump’ to Law and Justice Party’s chief ideologue Jaroslaw 
Kaczynski.22 
Support for Euroscepticism is one thing; wholeheartedly embracing events that 
could rupture the Union is another. The ‘Brexit’ debate is a good example. If 
Britain decides to leave the EU, it would be harder for Europe to make its mark 
on the global stage as it would lose a permanent member of the UN Security 
Council. Already under pressure by chaos in the Middle East and on its Eastern 
border, Brexit will seriously weaken the EU.23 As such, it is not surprising why 
Putin and pro-Kremlin media have actively embraced and promoted the idea 
of Brexit. Sputnik, RT and even the Russian Embassy in the UK have all been 
vividly running pro-Brexit coverage, ignoring the ‘In campaign’, providing 
platforms to the most fringe Brexit spokespeople.24 A similar strategy is used 
for the referendum on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement to be held in 
The Netherlands on 6 April. Arguments against ratification of the Agreement 
closely resemble those put forward by known Russian propaganda outlets. On 
4 February, Russia’s foreign ministry stated the referendum should comply with 
democratic procedures and that no excessive media pressure should be placed 
on voters.25 The irony of this message coming from an administration that only 2 
years earlier organised a bogus referendum in Crimea where such pressure was 
omnipresent was clearly not lost on twitter users around the world. Funny as this 
may be, the reality is that if Dutch voters vote ‘no’ they will hand Putin a major 
propaganda victory.
Embracing ‘Brexit’ and a ‘no’ vote on Ukraine serves two distinct purposes. 
First, it ensures that former Soviet states such as Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova 
and Belarus remain out of Brussel’s sights and are relegated to an ‘in between’ 
status that Putin can tinker with if deemed necessary. Second, it may succeed in 
breaking up the entire Union. If there is one thing Putin did not like it was the 
unified manner in which the EU imposed heavier sanctions on Russia after the 
downing of Malaysia Airlines flight 17 in July 2014. After all, it is much easier 
to deal with individual states than it is to fight a union of 28 with a powerful 
centre.
What Europe Should do
In 2016 Europe will face a number of important political choices, which will 
become key subjects in the ongoing discursive battleground between the EU 
and Russia. The decision whether or not to strike a political deal on the Nord 
Stream II pipeline, the referendum on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement 
in The Netherlands, and the referendum on the UK’s EU membership will all 
– to varying degrees – offer an important entry point for Russian narratives 
aimed at fostering intra-EU divisions. Allowing division, means allowing oneself 
to be ruled. In responding to Russian pressure it is essential to stand up for 
the values that made the EU into what it is today. On Nord Stream II that 
means letting competition law be the judge of whether the pipeline is a strictly 
commercial undertaking and resist the temptation of striking a political deal 
which risks upsetting the Energy Union. This must be coupled with a deliberate 
communications strategy aimed at affirming the EU’s market-based approach 
to energy policy. With respect to the April 6 referendum on Ukraine this means 
not abandoning the people of the Euromaidan who took it upon themselves to 
fight for a better future for their country. The success hereof will in no small part 
depend on the EU’s ability to counter narratives aimed at portraying Ukraine as 
“corrupt and inefficient” country, or appealing to its status as a “geopolitical 
buffer state.” A no vote would only serve to reward Russia and give the Kremlin 
additional “ammunition” to double down on its ongoing disinformation efforts 
in Ukraine and throughout Europe. On ‘Brexit’ this means that the people behind 
the ‘In’ campaign have a few more months to convince the British public that 
there are better ways to express frustration about alleged excessive influence 
from Brussels than to weaken Europe at a time when it is besieged by crises 
from all sides.
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